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CASE COMMENTS
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION:
A NEW RISK TO WITNESSES FACING FOREIGN
PROSECUTION
United States v. (Under Seal) (Areneta), 794 F.2d 920 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 331 (1986)
In United States v. (Under Seal) (Araneta),1 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit narrowly interpreted the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, holding that the privilege does not
extend to a grand jury witness who has received United States immunity
but faces a threat of foreign prosecution.2
The appellants, Irene and Gregorio Araneta, are the daughter and son-
in-law of the former President of the Philippines, Ferdinand E. Marcos.3
A federal grand jury subpoenaed the appellants to testify as to their
knowledge concerning illegal arms contracts with the Philippines. The
appellants moved to quash the subpoena, claiming a fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.4  The government subsequently
granted the appellants immunity from prosecution under United States
law and the district court ordered the appellants to testify.' The appel-
lants sought to overturn the district court's ruling, claiming that they
1. 794 F.2d 920 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 331 (1986).
2. Id. at 926.
3. Id. at 921. The Arenetas are Philippine citizens temporarily residing in the United States
under advanced parole status. The United States and Philippines had entered into a treaty, pending
in the Senate at the time of the decision, that provided for the appellants' extradition. The two
countries have agreements providing for the exchange of evidence and for cooperation regarding the
investigation of alleged corruption involving Philippine assets. Id.
4. Id at 922. See infra notes 8-21 and accompanying text discussing the fifth amendment
privilege.
5. Id. Compelling an individual to testify does not violate the fifth amendment if the individual
receives sufficient immunity from prosecution. See infra notes 8-17 and accompanying text. Immu-
nity derives from 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002 & 6003 (1982).
The court provided a restrictive order under FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (1982). Rule 6(e) protects the
secrecy of grand jury proceedings by disallowing disclosure of the content of such proceedings.
Courts are in sharp disagreement as to whether a Rule 6(e) order provides conclusive assurance of
non-disclosure to supplant the risk of self-incrimination. Compare In re Nigro, 705 F.2d 1224, 1227
(10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 927 (1983); In Re Baird, 668 F.2d 432 (8th Cir. 1982); In Re
Tierney, 465 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that secrecy order will eliminate the risk of prosecu-
tion and defeat claims based on the fifth amendment privilege) with In re Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116,
123-24 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Witness, 597 F.2d 1166, 1168-69 (9th Cir. 1979) (contra).
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continue to face criminal prosecution in the Philippines.6 The Fourth
Circuit affirmed and held: The fifth amendment does not prevent a court
from compelling a witness to give possibly self-incriminating testimony if
the witness faces only a risk of foreign prosecution.7
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution requires that
''no person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself."8 This constitutional privilege against self-incrimination
is not absolute.9 If the government removes the possibility of self-incrim-
ination through a grant of immunity, the court can compel the witness to
testify. 10 Prior to 1964, both state and federal courts could compel testi-
mony if a witness was granted immunity from prosecution under the
laws within the court's jurisdiction. The compelled testimony could be
used to incriminate the witness under the laws of the other sovereign."
In two 1964 decisions the Supreme Court resolved this dilemma. In
Malloy v. Hogan, 12 the Court held that the fifth amendment applies to
the states by reason of the fourteenth amendment.' 3 Concurrently, the
Court held in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor,'4
that the fifth amendment protects both a state witness from self-incrimi-
nation under federal law and a federal witness from self-incrimination
under state law.'" The Court prohibited the use in any subsequent prose-
cution of evidence obtained from testimony compelled after a grant of
immunity.16 To displace an individual's constitutionally protected right
See generally Note, Extending the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to the Threat of Prosecution
Under Foreign Law, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 141, 144 (1983).
6. 794 F.2d at 922. The Arenetas face charges under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act and Articles 210-221 of the Philippines Penal Code.
7. Id at 926.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
9. For a discussion of the limitations on the privilege against self-incriminations, see Note,
supra note 5, at 144; MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 121 (3d ed. 1984).
10. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378
U.S. 52 (1964).
11. See United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931) (the federal court can compel testimony
that would incriminate the witness in a state court).
12. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
13. Id. at 12. The Court held that the privilege, if properly invoked in a state proceeding, was
governed by federal standards.
14. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
15. Id. at 77-78. The Court rejected the approach previously taken in Murphy. See supra note
11 and accompanying text. Rather, the court adopted the interpretation of the privilege given by
English courts and the earlier Court decision in Ballman v. Fagin, 200 U.S. 186 (1906).
16. 378 U.S. at 79. Government prosecutors can charge a witness previously granted immu-
nity. In the event of a prosecution, however, "the prosecutor is saddled with the heavy burden of
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to withhold self-incriminating testimony, therefore, a witness must re-
ceive immunity equal to the risk of criminal prosecution.1 7
The fifth amendment privilege applies only to witnesses subject to
more than a remote possibility of criminal prosecution from the com-
pelled testimony.18 A witness seeking to withhold testimony based on a
risk of foreign prosecution must meet a higher threshold standard. The
witness must show a "real and substantial" threat of foreign prosecu-
tion. t9 In Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Commission of Investigation,2" the
Supreme Court affirmed the propriety of this threshold standard. The
Court, however, expressly declined to address the scope of the underlying
constitutional protection. 21
Lower courts have disagreed whether the fifth amendment prohibits
courts from compelling testimony when a risk of foreign prosecution ex-
ists. In In re Cardassi,22 the District Court for the District of Connecti-
cut held that the fifth amendment does protect a witness facing foreign
prosecution. 23 The court noted that in the United States, government
attempts to compel testimony or to use compelled testimony at trial are
proving that his evidence was not derived directly or indirectly from the witness' testimony." In re
Grand Jury Subpoena of Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 1982).
17. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972). In Kastigar, the Court found that
absolute immunity was not necessary to satisfy the fifth amendment. The Court explained that the
privilege only protects against compelled incriminating testimony, and ordinary use immunity effec-
tively eliminates the possibility of incrimination. Id, at 443. See also Flanagan, 691 F.2d at 119 (use
immunity is "coexistensive with the privilege" rendering a fifth amendment claim unsupportable).
See generally United States v. Flanagan: Guidelines for Determining Real Risk of Foreign Prosecu-
tion, 10 BROOKLYN J. INr'L. L. 219, 222-23 (1984).
18. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 489 (1951).
19. See Zicarella v. New Jersey State Comm. of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 478 (1972); Flana-
gan, 691 F.2d at 124; United States v. Yanagita, 552 F.2d 940, 947 (2d Cir. 1977). The threshold
test grew out of a sense of frustration and unwillingness to extend the privilege in a way that would
preclude a coexistensive grant of immunity and therefore require a fresh look at the fifth amendment
mandate. See generally Note, The Reach of the Fifth Amendment Privilege When Domestically Com-
pelled Testimony May Be Used in a Foreign Country's Court, 69 VA. L. REV. 875, 889-93 (19-).
In Flanagan the court identified several factors pertinent to the threshold determination. The
factors included:
[W]hether there is an existing or potential foreign prosecution of him; what foreign charges
could be filed against him; whether prosecution of them would be initiated or furthered by
his testimony; whether any such charges would entitle the foreign jurisdiction to have him
extradited from the United States; and whether there is a likelihood that his testimony
given here would be disclosed to the foreign government.
691 F.2d at 121.
20. 406 U.S. 472 (1972).
21. Id. at 481.
22. 351 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Conn. 1972).
23. Id. at 1085-86. In Cardassi, the witness was granted immunity to allow her to testify before
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limited by the fifth amendment.24 Because the fifth amendment does not
constrain a foreign government's use of testimony, the court ruled that a
witness can claim the privilege "at the point when the testimony is
sought to be judicially compelled."25
Similarly, in In Re Grand Jury Subpoena of Flanagan,2 6 the District
Court for the Eastern District of New York had concluded that the fifth
amendment extends to a witness facing only a risk of foreign prosecu-
tion.27 On appeal, the Second Circuit did not address the constitutional
issue, ruling that the witness had not satisfied the threshold test.28 The
court, however, did not expressly denounce the district court's "reasoned
opinion." 29
In Phoenix Assurance Co. of Canada v. Runck, ° the North Dakota
Supreme Court held that the fifth amendment privilege does not extend
to extraterritorial incrimination.3 I The court stated that the absence of
foreign reference in the language of the fifth amendment indicates that it
was designed to apply only to United States' laws. 32 The court also
noted that the practical difficulty courts would face in interpreting for-
eign laws could frustrate the practice of exchanging immunity for infor-
a grand jury proceeding. After receiving immunity, the witness continued to refuse to testify claim-
ing that she feared foreign prosecution. Id. at 1081.
24. Id. at 1085. In arguing for the testimony, the government relied on extradition cases in
which the individual sought to prevent extradition arguing that he may be forced to testify against
himself in the foreign jurisdiction in violation of the fifth amendment. Id. The court distinguished
these cases on two grounds. First, in the extradition cases the judicial branch is merely declining to
interfere with an executive power. Second, in the extradition cases there is no basis for testing the
foreign governments' actions against the fifth amendment. Id. In contrast, the court noted that
under the facts of the case, the actions of government are constrained by the fifth amendment. Id.
25. Id. at 1086.
26. 691 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1982).
27. Id. at 119. In Flanagan the witness refused to testify to a grand jury after a grant of United
States immunity, claiming that the immunity would not protect him from prosecution in Ireland or
Great Britain. He argued, therefore, that the immunity was not coextensive with the privilege. Id.
at 118-19. The district court ruled that the witness did face a substantial risk of foreign prosecution,
and concluded that the fifth amendment protects against this risk. Id.
28. Id. at 121-24. The Second Circuit noted that there was no prosecution pending, no effort
had been made to extradite the witness, and all questions related to conduct in the United States. Id.
at 122. The court identified several factors relevant to determine whether the threshold test is satis-
fied. See supra note 19.
29. Id. at 119. Because the court decided that a risk of foreign prosecution did not exist, the
court stated that it need not address the constitutional issue. Id at 124.
30. 317 N.W.2d 402 (N.D. 1982).
31. Id. at 413. In Runck, a defendant in a civil suit for insurance fraud refused to answer in
discovery proceedings because he faced the threat of arson prosecution in Canada. Id. at 404-05.
32. Id. at 411.
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mation.33 In conclusion, the court stated that until treaties are enacted,
"the fifth amendment privilege cannot be asserted by a witness on the
grounds of possible foreign prosecution." 4
In United States v. (Under Seal) (Areneta),"5 the Fourth Circuit agreed
with the Runck result. The court concluded that the defendants did face
a substantial risk of foreign prosecution 6 and proceeded to examine the
fifth amendment privilege. The court noted the absence of foreign refer-
ences in the language of the fifth amendment and positted that the fifth
amendment never can restrain foreign law. 7 The court then analogized
to the state of the law before Mallory and Murphy and concluded that the
fifth amendment privilege applies only when both the sovereign compel-
ling the testimony and the sovereign threatening to use the testimony are
subject to the constitution.3" The court thus limited the fifth amendment
protection against self-incrimination to witnesses facing a threat of crimi-
nal prosecution within the United States. The court found that its hold-
ing would not imperil the purposes underlying the fifth amendment
privilege-protecting individual dignity and conscience, and preserving
the accusatorial nature of the criminal justice system. 39
33. Id. The court stated that:
Realistically... the officials of this nation or states cannot be expected to know the various
penal provisions written or unwritten of the numerous nations. (However, in this case we
have been furnished the Canadian law.) This in itself can lead to endless insoluble
problems and could effectively prevent either the federal government or the state govern-
ment from successfully employing the grant of immunity and the concomitant requirement
to testify.
Id. The court did not, however, address the purposes behind the fifth amendment in reaching its
decision.
34. Id. at 413.
35. 794 F.2d 920 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 331 (1986).
36. Id. at 924-25. The court applied the factors enumerated in Flanagan. See supra note 19.
The court noted the notoriety of the appellants and the corresponding insufficiency of the Rule 6(e)
secrecy order, that actual indictments had issued against the appellants, the possibility that the ap-
pellants will lose their discretionary parole status in the United States and face extradition, and the
current active United States role in assisting the new Philippine government in recovering allegedly
stolen assets. Id.
37. Id. at 925.
38. Id. at 926. Prior to the Supreme Court's decisions in Malloy and Murphy, the sovereign
compelling the testimony and the sovereign wishing to use the testimony were not both subject to the
fifth amendment prohibition against compelled self-incrimination. See supra notes 11-17 and accom-
panying text. The court noted that the same situation exists under the facts of this case.
39. 794 F.2d at 926. The Supreme Court in Murphy had enumerated the purposes of the privi-
lege as:
[O]ur unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accu-
sation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial
system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by
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By analogizing to pre-1964 case law, the Fourth Circuit recreates an
evil that the Supreme Court corrected in Malloy and Murphy. Before
1964, if an individual received immunity under federal law, for example,
and was forced to testify, the witness often opened himself to criminal
prosecution under state law.' The Supreme Court effectively remedied
this injustice by disallowing the subsequent use of compelled testimony
unless the grant of immunity extends to all United States jurisdic-
tions41-a corrective measure unavailable in cases of foreign prosecution.
The Areneta court also fails to adequately explain why the fifth amend-
ment only protects against self-incrimination when the sovereign compel-
ling the testimony and the sovereign seeking to use the testimony are
subject to the constitution.42 That the United States cannot force a for-
eign government to respect its immunity law presents a stronger argu-
ment in favor of respecting an individual's interest in withholding the
incriminating information. The court's analysis suggests that when the
United States' immunity laws cannot arise, the constitutional privilege
does not exist. Yet when a party raises a fifth amendment claim in a civil
case, where immunity plays no role, the courts must sacrifice the infor-
mation and uphold the fifth amendment protection.43
Although the court reiterates the purposes of the fifth amendment
privilege, the court's holding implicitly values the available information
more. The court's argument that it "would be intolerable to require the
United States to forego evidence legitimately within its reach solely be-
cause a foreign power could deploy this evidence,"'  merely begs the
question by assuming the legitimacy that is the very question for the
court to deliberate and decide. If the court balances the competing inter-
ests, at a minimum the fifth amendment's purposes deserve more than
the court's cursory treatment.
The court errs in assuming that the accusatorial nature of our criminal
inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair state-individ-
ual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is
shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individ-
ual to shoulder the entire load."
378 U.S. at 55 (citing 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).
40. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
41. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
42. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
43. See McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2252 (Mc-
Naughton rev. 1961). The fifth amendment only prohibits compelled self-incrimination in criminal
prosecutions. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
44. 794 F.2d at 926 (emphasis added).
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justice system will not suffer as a result of the court's decision.4" On the
contrary, this decision allows and even encourages searching inquiry into
actions that may form the basis of a subsequent accusation by a foreign
government-a result inconsistent with an accusatorial criminal justice
system. In addition, the court virtually disregards the fifth amendment
policy of protecting individual dignity and conscience by tersely averring
that the grant of immunity was a generous act of the United States in
favor of the Areneta's dignity and self-interest. As a result of the court's
decision, if a witness faces foreign prosecution, a grant of United States
immunity becomes an offensive weapon, carving away a witness' interest
in self-preservation.
The real flaw in the court's analysis lies in its misplaced emphasis on
the forbidden use of compelled testimony. Only when a restriction on
government's use of compelled testimony completely removes the possi-
bility of incrimination can the court satisfy the Constitution in compel-
ling the testimony. In other words, only if the second door-immunity
from incrimination-is secure can a court open the first door--compel-
ling testimony. Knowing that the second door is open mandates that the
court tightly secure the first. United States courts control the compulsion
of testimony. The fifth amendment mandate does not disappear because
foreign countries do not observe our immunity laws.4 6
S.R.B.
45. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
46. 794 F.2d at 926. The court stated, "With regard to insulating the individual from the moral
hazards of self-incrimination, perjury or contempt, the United States has done everything in its
power to relieve the pressure by granting the Aranetas use and derivative use immunity." Id.
1987]
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